Metrolinx overspeed incident demonstrates urgent need for Enhanced Train Control, requires independent investigation
By Transport Action Ontario | Intercity Rail and Bus
Revelations in the Toronto Star on March 13, 2026 alerted the public of a potentially catastrophic near-miss incident on January 5, 2026 involving a GO train traversing a 15 mph crossover at almost 70 mph, narrowly avoiding a derailment. This incident had not been publicly and independently investigated. In response, Transport Action Ontario wrote to Metrolinx CEO Michael Lindsay and Ontario Minister of Transportation Prabmeet Sakaria on March 16, with a clear request:
We require Metrolinx to immediately transfer responsibility for this investigation and all other near-miss incident investigations to the Transportation Safety Board of Canada.
Our letter to Mr. Lindsay is attached. Despite sending a follow-up email two weeks later, we have not received a response to this letter, which deepens our concern.
An internal investigation is not appropriate or acceptable for a near-miss that easily could have become a very serious accident with multiple fatalities, and with similarities to the VIA Rail Burlington crash of 2012. The article also revealed that this was the fourth time in the past year that a GO train had passed a stop signal. The investigation of these incidents and all similar incidents on any railway in Canada, whether provincially or federally regulated, must be fully independent and handled by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada.
Transport Action Ontario recognizes and welcomes the progress Metrolinx has made in improving its own and Canada’s safety practices and requiring its suppliers to appoint an Independent Safety Assessor in accordance with global best practices. The same rigorous safety culture must also apply to the operating railway, with fully independent and transparent safety oversight and investigation that also generates detailed public reports and findings that both current and future railway professionals can learn from. This is in line with global best practices, to continuously improve safety for railway employees, passengers, and the general public.
Similar incidents in the United Kingdom (Overspeed at Spital Junction, Peterborough) and Australia (Exceedance of temporary speed restriction by XPT ST21, Lack of effective risk controls prior to Blacktown rail overspeed event), for example, are independently investigated, as are Metrolinx incidents on CN trackage (R24T0064 – Movement exceeds limits of authority).
Independent investigations also help to ensure that the railway’s safety culture is just and fair, like airline safety culture, so train crews are not disciplined for raising concerns nor for happening to be on duty when the system fails around them. We also therefore regard the swift dismissal of the Alstom crew from the January incident, prior to the completion of an independent investigation, as a possible additional source of concern.
Urgent need for Enhanced Train Control
Since 1995, the Transportation Safety Board has recommended engineering controls to prevent signals being passed in error. Such technology is used worldwide and has existed in various forms since as early as 1872. Transport Canada published a Notice of Intent in 2022 describing how it intended to implement Enhanced Train Control in Canada by 2030, a target date which now appears likely to be missed.
Metrolinx has chosen European Train Control System (ETCS) technology to provide this crucial safety system, and is working toward a pilot deployment and testing. Once ETCS Level 2 is implemented across the GO network, it will automatically update each train’s onboard computer and cab display with movement authorities and upcoming track speed information. It will also enforce braking if the locomotive engineer does not respond appropriately, reducing the risk of an overspeed incident or passing a stop signal to very low levels.
Based on recent information on GO Expansion timelines, it appears that ETCS will not be installed until electrification is installed, up to 10 years from now. The additional near-misses on the GO network, not previously publicly disclosed by Metrolinx, on top of frequent near-misses and incidents on federally regulated trackage across Canada that have been investigated by the TSB, indicates that further delay in ETCS implementation involves more risk than policymakers may previously have been aware of.
While the risk of a passenger on any given GO train trip being involved in an incident that results in injury is still low, and far lower than the risk of driving in Ontario, the risk for regular commuters is cumulative over time and could reach unacceptable levels if engineering controls to reduce it are not implemented in reasonable time.
We therefore asked Mr. Lindsay to share with us Metrolinx’s risk assessment for the currently expected timeline for the rollout of ETCS, together with any additional technical and operational measures that the agency is or will now be taking to control this risk to the lowest reasonably practicable level in the intervening years.
According to the Toronto Star’s report, the internal Metrolinx report also expressed concern about reputational damage. Safety must come first, otherwise reputation is forfeit anyway. Railway safety is achieved through transparent and independent public investigation of accidents and near misses, and then promptly acting upon the findings of those investigations, which in Canada includes the implementation of Enhanced Train Control.
We call upon the province of Ontario to ensure that Metrolinx has all the technical and financial resources necessary to complete the deployment of ETCS as soon as reasonably practicable and with a clearly defined project timeline.
